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Abstract
In the aftermath of sovereign defaults and ﬁnancial crises in the 1990s, there have
been calls for the widespread use by sovereigns of equity-like ﬁnancial instruments,
in particular, of GDP-indexed bonds. This paper calibrates a general equilibrium
model with endogenous default to a typical emerging market economy and evaluates
whether the existence of a (partially) GDP-indexed bond, as proposed in the liter-
ature, is quantitatively important in what concerns spreads, debt to GDP ratios,
and the likelihood of default.
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1 Introduction
The sovereign defaults and ﬁnancial crises of the 1990s renewed the calls for the estab-
lishment of institutions that would minimize the likelihood of occurrence of these events.
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1A c c o r d i n gt oR o g o ﬀ (1999), “[t]he main problem with the present system is that it contains
strong biases towards debt ﬁnance [...] and does not adequately support equity ﬁnance and
direct investment,” which would enhance enhance risk sharing, leading to more eﬃcient
allocations and higher growth (Obstfeld, 1994). Though debt contracts tend not to be
explictly state contingent, the eﬃcient contract may implicitly provide partial insurance
to the borrower, allowing for repayments contingent upon the realization of certain states
of the nature, thus making default excusable when the borrower is hit by certain shocks
(Grossman and Van Huyck, 1988; Bulow and Rogoﬀ, 1989a). However, evidence shows
that default is often associated with output drops and may indeed be at the origin of
such losses (Chuhan and Sturzenegger, 2003, revise some of the empirical evidence). An
explicit risk-sharing mechanism that would minimize the likelihood of default would also
be likely to eliminate the ampliﬁcation eﬀects on output associated with default episodes.
The sovereign is still the most important external debtor in most of the emerging
market countries [check, build table with GDF data]. This poses an additional diﬃculty
to the creation of risk-sharing-enhancing ﬁnancial instruments because of the well-known
conﬂict between incentives and insurance motives. A natural candidate would be revenue-
contingent claims; however, moral hazard and the high cost of monitoring to avoid the
sovereign shirking on its job of revenue collection or mis-reporting that collection make
the existence of revenue-contingent ﬁnancial claims very hard to sustain. As a way of
circumventing the inability of sovereigns to issue equity, Borensztein and Mauro (2004)
ressuscitated the proposal to create of GDP-indexed bonds.
The idea to create GDP-indexed bonds comes on the tradition of several proposals to
create explicit contingent debt contracts. The main common idea of these proposals is that
debt contracts should be indexed to a variable that is outside of the control of the sovereign
(like commodity prices), otherwise the moral hazard problem would subside. Among all
t h ep o s s i b l eb e n e ﬁts related with the creation of GDP-indexed bonds, probably the most
important is the insurance it provides to borrower countries, as GDP growth works as
an aggregator of several types of shocks (commodity prices, terms of trade, catastrophes,
etc) that can hit the economy. The problems of adoption of low-growth policies and mis-
2reporting however still persist. To this objection, Borensztein and Mauro (2004) counter
that, if anything, it is high growth, not low growth, that leads politicians to re-election;
that is, the interests of politicians may indeed be aligned with those of the international
investors. However, as recognized by these authors, ﬁnancial instruments indexed to
a statistical indicator would be easier to create by countries that comply with reliable
statistics and that are credibly commited to sound policies. Financial instruments of this
t i y p ea r en o tu n h e a r do ﬀ:i n ﬂation-indexed bonds are an example of the feasibility to
index bonds to statistical indicators that are, most of the times, produced by government
agencies.1
This paper examines whether the quantitative implications of (partially) GDP-indexed
bonds for spreads, debt to GDP ratios, and probabilities of default are substantially
diﬀerent from those implied by standard debt instruments. With this purpose, this paper
develops a general equilibrium model with endogenous default thatbuilds on the seminal
work by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and more recent work by Arellano (2005), and
Aguiar and Gopinath (2006). A quantitative exercise as the one presented in this paper is
especially relevant in a setup in which the underlying stochastic process for output appears
as a crucial component to evaluate the beneﬁts of risk sharing (Aguiar and Gopinath,
2005; Jeanne and Gourinchas, 2005), the decisions to default and the implied interest
rates (Arellano, 2005; Aguiar and Gopinath, 2006). Moreover, this paper can be seen
as a complement to previous work by Chamon and Mauro (2005); however, whereas
their paper aimed to develop a pricing model that would be easy and ready to use by
market practitioners, this paper aims to evaluate whether the existence of (partially)
GDP-indexed bonds makes a diﬀerence from a quantitative point of view. In particular,
this paper recognizes the endogenous nature of default decisions, whereas Chamon and
Mauro (2005) use ad-hoc trigger rules of default.2
1Borensztein and Mauro (2004) do an extensive review of the history of the ideas behind their proposal
as well as the history of ﬁnancial innovation at the sovereign level, providing some examples of existing
equity-like instruments for sovereigns. They also review in a comprehensive way the beneﬁts, obstacles,
and possible solutions associated with the creation of GDP-indexed bonds. They also brieﬂyc o v e rt h e
alternative of indexing bonds to exports.
2General equilibrium models have been widely used for asset pricing since the seminal work by Lucas
(1978). For ane xtensive survey of the literature, see Cochrane (2001).
3The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the ba-
sic model, with the standard one-period uncontingent bond when ouput processes allow
for a stochastic trend. Section III extends the model to incorporate (partially) GDP-
indexed bonds. Section IV calibrates and computes the model for several emerging market
economies. Section V concludes.
2 The model
2.1 The basic model
Consider a small open economy whose sovereign is the only agent with access to interna-
tional capital markets. The sovereign is a benevolent planner who maximizes the expected






whose instantaneous utility function u(•) satisﬁes the standard assumptions in the liter-
ature: it is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, stricly increasing, and stricly concave.
The sovereign can issue one period bonds at face value against the promise to pay
an interest rate deﬁned at the date of issue. However, contracts are not enforceable. At
the beginning of each period, the sovereign observes the endowment, yt, and then decides
whether to default or to honor its obligations:







If the sovereign decides not to default, it can borrow (or save) by selling (buying) bonds
bt+1 > 0 (< 0) in the international markets at a gross interest rate R(bt+1,y t);t h e
promised interest rate depends on the amount borrowed (bt+1), and on the endowment
shock at time t (yt). For all bt+1 ≤ 0, R(bt+1,y t)=Rt+1, regardless of the endowment
shock and the amount borrowed, where Rt+1 is the world risk-free (gross) interest rate
4(U.S. treasury bonds). The value of not defaulting for the sovereign is then given by
V










ct + bt+1 = yt + R(bt,y t−1)bt.
If a country decides to default, then it is excluded from the international markets. How-
ever, there is a constant exogenous probability θ that the country main regain access to
the international capital markets.3 Once in autarky, the country can only consume a
fraction α of its endowment, αyt, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.4 Therefore, the value of defaulting is
V
D (yt)=u(αyt)+β (1 − θ)EtV
D (yt+1)+βθEtV
C (0,y t+1).
International investors are risk-neutral agents who compete in an environment without
barriers to entry. Therefore, the return they get from lending to this sovereign must equal,
in expected terms, the return they would get from investing in risk-free assets:





D (yt+1) ≥ V
C (bt+1,y t+1)/yt
ª
is the probability the sovereign defaults at date t+1given she borrowed bt+1 and endow-
ment at date t was yt.
3Here, I follow the current strand of literature on sovereign debt. The literature on sovereign default
models postulates the exclusion of a defaulting country from international capital markets from that
moment on, with an exogenous probability of re-entry (see, for example, Aguiar and Gopinath, 2006, and
Arellano, 2005; Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981, build an extreme of this case, excluding defaulters forever).
4Reductions in output as a consequence of defaults have been identiﬁed by Chuan and Sturzenegger
(2002), and incorporated in sovereign debt models by Cole and T. Kehoe (1998), Alfaro and Kanczuk
(2005), Arellano (2005), and Aguiar and Gopinath (2006). Dooley (2000) builds a model that provides
micro-foundations for this fact.
52.2 The nature of output shocks
Emerging market economies are characterized by a higher volatility of output than devel-
oped economies. Moreover, as shown by Aguiar and Gopinath (2005), emerging markets
experience extremely volatile shocks to a stochastic trend, that is, business cycle ﬂuctua-
tions in these countries are explained mostly by permanent shocks, instead of by transitory
shocks.5 In another paper, Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) show that a model with shocks to
the trend (permanent shock) is able to match the pattern of default of emerging market
economies, a feature that a model with only transitory shocks is not able to replicate.
Transitory shocks do not substantially aﬀect either the value of defaulting, the value of
ﬁnancial integation, or the relative value of both decisions, and so the decision to default
comes mostly from the level of debt outstanding; knowing this fact, international investors
demand an interest rate schedule steep enough such that sovereigns seldom ﬁnd it opti-
mal to hold levels of debt that would induce them to default (Arellano, 2005; Aguiar
and Gopinath, 2006). However, as explained by Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), shocks
to the trend substantially aﬀect both the value of defaulting and the value of ﬁnancial
integration, and, more importantly, the relative value of the two decisions. The decision
to default is then more sensitive to the realization of shocks, and less so to the amount of
debt held, thus generating an interest rate schedule less sensitive to debt holdings, which
leads to sovereigns issuing debt amounts that make default more likely.
Given the evidence on the importance of shocks to the trend for emerging markets,
this section revamps the model presented above to accomodate output processes with
both transitory and permanent shocks. The notation and the modelling options follow
closely Aguiar and Gopinath (2006). The endowment has two components, a transitory
element zt and a trend Γt,
yt = e
ztΓt.
5Most of these shocks have their origins in changes in government policy. This is an important
argument against the applicability of GDP-indexed bonds to these countries. However, as Borensztein
and Mauro (2004) emphasized, it may be a good way to borrow for emerging market countries credibly
commited to good policies. It is out of the scope of this paper to discuss the the nature and existence of
commitment mechanisms that would tie governments with a good policy.
6The transitory shock follows an autoregressive process AR(1) around a mean µz
zt = µz (1 − ρz)+ρzzt−1 + ε
z
t,
with |ρz| < 1, εz
t ∼ N (0,σ2
z). The growth rate of the trend, gt,h a sam e a nµg
Γt = gtΓt−1,





























To accomodate these stochastic processes for the transitory component and for the
trend, the state variable yt of the basic model is replaced by the pair (zt,g t), and so the
sovereign’s value function at date t takes the form:
V (bt,z t,g t)=m a x
©
V






C (bt,z t,g t)=m a x
ct,bt+1
{u(ct)+βEtV (bt+1,z t+1,g t+1)}
s.t.
ct + bt+1 = yt + R(bt,z t−1,g t−1)bt,
and
V
D (zt,g t)=u(αyt)+β (1 − θ)EtV
D (zt+1,g t+1)+βθEtV
C (0,z t+1,g t+1).
7As before, the non-arbitrage condition for the interest rates holds
Rt =( 1− π(bt+1,z t,g t))R(bt+1,z t,g t),
with
π(bt+1,z t,g t)=P r
©
V
D (zt+1,g t+1) ≥ V
C (bt+1,z t+1,g t+1)/zt,g t
ª
being the probability the sovereign defaults at date t +1given she borrowed bt+1 and
endowment shocks at date t were zt and gt.










where mt+1 is the stochastic discount factor, xi
t+1 is the payoﬀ of security i,a n dqi
t is its









t+1 is the marginal return of security i. For standard asset pricing models, agents
are small in the sense that they take the returns as given, so total returns are linear in
quantities, thus making indiﬀerent the distinction between marginal and average return.
However, in the present model, the sovereign is not small as she is aware that the in-
terest rate charged depends on the amount borrowed, so marginal and average returns
are diﬀerent: the average expected return is (1 − π(bt+1,z t,g t))R(bt+1,z t,g t) whereas
the marginal return, assuming diﬀerentiability of π(•,z t,g t) for the sake of expositional
simplicity, is
∂(1−π(bt+1,zt,gt))R(bt+1,zt,gt)bt+1




∂ (1 − π(bt+1,z t,g t))R(bt+1,z t,g t)bt+1
∂bt+1
¸
= Et [mt+1Rt+1]=1 ,
where mt+1 = β
u0(ct+1)
u0(ct) .
83 The model with (partially) GDP-indexed bonds
Consider now an economy in all identical to the economy described in the above, with a
single exception: whereas in the previous economy the sovereign only has access to one
period uncontingent bonds, in this economy the sovereign can issue bonds whose payoﬀs
are a function of the state of the nature. In particular, bonds issued at date t pay an
interest ˜ R(bt+1,z t,g t) plus a diﬀerential γt+1 − ¯ γ,w h e r eγt+1 is the growth rate of output
from date t to date t+1,a n d¯ γ is a reference value (for example, a historical average) above
(below) which the borrower pays a premium (discount) on the interest rate contracted at
date t.6 As suggested by Borensztein and Mauro (2004), a cap is imposed on the discount







1,γt+1 − κ(bt+1,z t,g t)
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κ(bt+1,z t,g t)=¯ γ − ˜ R(bt+1,z t,g t).
Whereas in the previous economy interest rates to be paid in date t+1are contracted
and known at date t, in this economy, for bt+1 > 0, the interest rate to be eﬀectively paid
at date t +1is unknown at date t. In this case, the sovereign sells a call option with a
unit price and a strike price that is a function of the amount borrowed and the state of
the economy κ(bt+1,z t,g t)=¯ γ − ˜ R(bt+1,z t,g t).7 Whenever the economy grows above the
strike price, γt+1 >κ(bt+1,z t,g t), the option pays a positive payoﬀ. If the economy grows
exactly at the reference level ¯ g, then the option pays the interest rate contracted at date
6The interest rate ˜ r(bt+1,y t) does not have to coincide with r(bt+1,y t),s oad i ﬀerent notation applies.
7In this paper, the strike price is endogenous. This is another diﬀerence with relation to the work by
Chamon and Mauro (2005): in their paper the interest rate contracted at date t is assumed, and imposed
to be the same as that of an uncontingent one period bond, i.e., r(bt+1,y t)=ˆ r(bt+1,y t).
9t, ˜ R(bt+1,z t,g t). If the economy grows above the reference level, then the option pays the
interest rate contracted at date t, plus a premium equal to the growth rate diﬀerential,
γt+1 − ¯ γ.
As before, the sovereign decides whether to default or to honor its obligations after
observing the realization of shocks to the growth rate
In this economy, the value of not defaulting is then given by
V










ct + bt+1 = yt +( 1+ˆ r(bt,y t−1,g t))bt.
As before, the value of defaulting is
V
D (yt)=u(αyt)+β (1 − π)EtV
D (yt+1)+βπEtV
C (0,y t+1,g t+1),
and so after observing the endowment yt and the growth rate gt, the sovereign decides
whether to default or to nor its obligations
V (bt,y t,g t)=m a x
©
V




4 Data and calibration
Calibration and data follow previous work by Arellano (2005) and Aguiar and Gopinath
(2006).
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